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the prior record of the juvenile was entered into evidence against the better interest of the youth. The youth or his counsel could say that this is
self-incrimination and against the better interest of the youth, and should
not be admissible as evidence against the youth.
5. Escobedo Ruling-This case was an Illinois case which stated
that persons under the due process clause of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States should be given
their right to counsel and representation before and during trial and
should be apprised of their constitutional rights so that they will not put
themselves in jeopardy against their better interest. It is the author's
firm opinion that all youths should be given their constitutional rights
and human rights and the needed due process protection, just as adults,
if not more so, because they are not as aware of the implications.
CONCLUSION

Sweeping reforms are needed in handling juvenile offenders. There
should be an initial program of probation without a finding for first offenders. All juvenile records should be impounded and opened only upon
the showing of good cause to be determined by a hearing. Opening of a
juvenile's file should not be granted ex parte.
All decisions in juvenile court should be appealable. All out-of-court
admissions or confessions from the adjudicatory stage of juvenile
proceedings denied in court should be excluded.
SHEILA M.

PARRISHr

The Insurance Contract and Policy in
General as it Relates to North Carolina
INTRODUCTION

A contract of insurance as taken from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-3, is an
agreement by which the insurer is bound to pay money or its equivalent
or to do some act of value to the insured upon, and as an indemnity or reimbursement for, the destruction, loss, or injury of something in which
the other party has an interest.
A contract of insurance can further be defined as a method to indemnify the assured for loss. It is that portion of a contract under which
a company agrees to indemnify the assured for loss or damage from perils
therein defined, with provision for subrogation of the company to the
right of assured against third persons. However that part of the contract
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under which the company obligates itself to pay to any shipper or consignee claims for which the insured would be liable by provisions of a
statute, with stipulation that the insured should reimburse the company
for any such payment, is a surety contract.
Generally an insurance premium, as found under 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 530 (1967), may be defined as the agreed price for assuming
and carrying the risk; in other words, the consideration paid an insurer
for undertaking to indemnify the insured against a specific peril.
Unless payment of premium is waived, it is a condition precedent to
insurance coverage, as noted in Engleberg v. Home Insurance Company'
where the agent mailed notice of cancellation for failure of insured to pay
premium to become effective within ten days. Two months later Engleberg was involved in an automobile accident, with no coverage on his
vehicle. Also of importance is the fact that the cancellation notice is only
required to be mailed to the address of the insured as set out in the
policy.
When a contract of insurance is finally complete, customarily it is
embodied in a formal written instrument, termed a policy. This instrument merges all prior agreements touching the transactions, and by accepting it the insured is conclusively presumed in the absence of fraud
to have given his assent to all of its terms. In State Distributing Corp. v.
Travelers Indemnity Company,' the insured applied for both robbery and
burglary insurance, and the insurance binder gave such protection. However, the formal policy subsequently issued covered robbery only, and the
insured's retention of the policy without objection for more than five (5)
months constituted an acceptance of the policy as written, thereby precluding recovery against the insurer for loss from burglary.
As stated in Sanders v. Charlotte Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,3 an insurance company generally has the right to fix the conditions
upon which it will become liable, and the patron has the right to accept
or refuse them. It was held in the Sanders case, supra, that when the
policy provided for double indemnity if death were to result from visible
bodily injuries through external, violent and accidental means and no
signs of violence were found on decedent's body and the coroner testified
that the decedent died by smothering, the insurer was not liable under
the double indemnity clause to pay such a type of benefit.
1
B

140 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1959).
30 S.E.2d 377 (N.C.
1944).

157 S.E.2d 614 (N.C. 1963).
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Statutory provisions in force at the time of the issuance of a policy
of insurance become a part thereof as though expressly incorporated
therein, and the statutory provisions will prevail over conflicting provisions of the policy. While the parties may contract for fuller coverage
than that provided by the statutory forms, provisions having the effect
of making the policy more restrictive than the standard statutory form
are void. However, if the limits of coverage are consistent with the statute,
additional coverage beyond the specifications of the policy will not be
implied.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-28, all contracts of insurance on property, lives, or interests in this state shall be deemed to be made therein, and
all contracts of insurance the applications of which are taken within the
state shall be deemed to have been made within this state and are subject
to the laws thereof.
Also of importance is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-29, which provides that
there is no insurance contract except under this chapter. It is unlawful
for any company to make any contract of insurance upon or concerning
any property or interest or lives in this state, or with any resident thereof,
or for any person as insurance agent or insurance broker to make, negotiate, solicit, or in any manner aid in the transaction of such insurance,
unless and except as authorized under the provisions of this chapter.
The previous statements are in general a complete coverage of contracts of insurance in North Carolina as stated.
BINDERS

A binder in the field of insurance, or a binding slip, is merely a written memorandum including the most important terms of a preliminary
contract of insurance intended to give temporary protection pending the
investigation of the risk by the insurer or until the issuance of a formal
policy, and by intendment it is subject to all conditions in the policy to be
issued.4
A binder is an insurer's acknowledgment of its contract to protect
the insured against casualty of a specified kind until a formal policy can
be issued or until the insurer gives notice of its election to terminate the
contract. In order to be valid, a binder need not be a complete contract,
since it is merely a memorandum of the most important terms of a preliminary contract of insurance, and where the contemplated policy is
required by statute, the binder is deemed to incorporate all of the terms
'30 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 1944).
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of the statutory policy, and no specific form or provision is necessary to
constitute a valid memorandum. Construction of alleged insurance
binders and their legal effect are questions for the court, and not the jury,
and determination of these questions by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina upon a prior appeal is conclusive.
In order for a binder to constitute a valid contract of insurance, the
agent who issues it must have actual authority from the insurance company to issue the binder on its behalf. The extension of credit to the
insured for the premium does not destroy the effectiveness of a binder.
In Wiles v. Mullinox,5 it was held that insurance agents in an action for
negligent failure to provide compensation coverage were entitled to argue
that they had procured the insurance and that it was in effect at the time
of the injury. Also they should be allowed to read pertinent statutes and
court decisions upon questions in point, where there was evidence upon
which a jury might base its findings.
It should be noted further that the insured may accept the benefits of
a binder even though he had no knowledge that the insurance broker had
issued the binder for his protection. Also, delivery of the binder to him
is not essential.
In an action against an insurance agent for breach of duty to exercise
due diligence to provide compensation insurance and for failure to notify
the proposed insured of his failure to procure such insurance, testimony
of a defendant agent that he had authority from the insurer to issue a
binder and that some twenty-six days prior to the loss he had forwarded
to the insurer a document constituting a binder covering a period of
one year beginning some eleven days prior to the loss in question, is
sufficient to support a finding that there was a valid binder in force on the
date of the loss. This was held sufficient notwithstanding advice by the
insurer to the agency nine days before the loss in question that the insurer
would not accept the risk. The fact that a valid binder for workmen's
compensation insurance cannot be terminated except by giving thirty
days' notice to the insured is the reason insurer would not accept the
risk.'
INSURABLE INTEREST

AND

PUBLIC POLICY

In a case where the insured has no insurable interest in the subject
matter of the policy, the policy is void as being against public policy.
155 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 1967).
5Id.
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An insurable interest is some interest such as the law will recognize and
protect. In the case of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v.
Regan, it was held that the named insured who lacked insurable interest
in the automobile covered by fire and hail policy, voluntarily permitted the
proceeds of the policy to be paid for repair of the automobile and therefore it was not any defense to insurer's action to recover payment from
him. Furthermore, an action to recover money paid under mistake of
fact is one in assumpsit, and is permitted on the theory that by such
payment, the recipient has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the
party making the payment and thusly is liable for money had and received.
Where the insured has no such interest, the fact that a person who
does have an insurable interest lends his consent to the transaction, does
not lend validity to the policy of insurance.8
LAWS THAT GOVERN

A contract of insurance based upon an application made while the insured was residing in this state must be construed in accordance with the
laws of this state rather than the laws in force at the time of the inception
of the contract in the state in which the insurer is incorporated. In the
case of Pace v. New York Life Insurance Company,' it was held that
when an application for a 20-year dividend accumulation life policy provided that on payment of premium and delivery of policy, that the policy
should relate back and take effect as of the date of the application. Further
the policy which was issued and delivered ten days later provided that it
took effect as the date of application. Subsequently a second policy was
issued on the same application, and some sixteen years later insured
failed to pay premiums and the value of the policies after deducting loans
was applied by insurer to purchase paid-up term insurance in accordance
with the terms of the policies. The period of paid-up term insurance
was properly calculated by insurer from the date of application and not
from the date of delivery of the policies.
A provision in the policy that it should be governed by the laws of the
state of the domicil of the insurer is void insofar as the courts of this
state are concerned. It was noted in Cordell v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen" that when a beneficial association as122 S.E.2d 774 (N.C. 1961).

'44 C.J.S. Insurance § 175 at 869.

'14 S.E.2d 411 (N.C. 1941).
'" 182 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 1935).
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sumed absolute obligation to pay benefits for total permanent disability,
provisions that decisions of its own tribunals upon claims for benefits
should be conclusive, was held not binding upon a member, when the rejection of a member's claim by the association's tribunals was arbitrary
and unreasonable.
In North Carolina, insurance policies issued by foreign corporations,
applications for which are taken within the State of North Carolina, are
to be construed in accordance with the laws of North Carolina, and not
the foreign state of the Home Office of the insurance company. However,
when a contract of insurance is negotiated and executed in the state in
which the insured is a resident, then it will be construed in accordance
with the laws of that state in an action in this state (North Carolina).
This was the case in Roomy v. Allstate Insurance Company" where it
was held that even though the automobile liability policy which was issued
in New York, and contained no provision for coverage because of the
death of, or injuries to insured's spouse, the policy had to be interpreted
in accordance with the New York law in determining the insurer's liability
for injuries sustained in North Carolina.
THE

REFORMATION

OF POLICIES

A policy of insurance like any other written instrument may be reformed for mutual mistakes or for mistakes induced by fraud, or inequitable conduct of the adverse party; and parol evidence is competent
to establish the right to such equitable relief, but the proof must be clear,
strong, and convincing. It was held in McCollum v. Old Republic Life
Insurance Company" that when an eighty-three year old woman failed
to read the effective date of her term policy, it would not as a matter of
law bar an action for recovery or for reformation. The complaint in the
case above in which the effective date was not in accord with the intent
of the parties therefore stated a cause of action for reformation.
To further this explanation, it was held in McCollum v. Old Republic
Life Insurance Company13 that an action to reform a certificate of insurance issued under a group policy on the lives of borrowers, where
evidence that the premium was paid for a twelve month period, and
that the effective date of the certificate as typewritten thereon, antedated
the time the loan was actually made by three days, together with evidence
11
12
13

125 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. 1962).
131 S.E.2d 435 (N.C. 1963).
137 S.E.2d 164 (N.C. 1964).
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of prior customs between the parties, was held sufficient to overrule the
insurer's motion to nonsuit.
TKE POLICY CONSTRUCTION

AND OPERATION

It has been noted in Stanback v. Winston Mutual Life Insurance
Company 4 that where a $300.00 policy contained a preliminary provisionIf after this policy takes effect, death should occur during the first
six months and the insured is ten years of age next birthday or over,
no greater amount than one-half of the insurance provided herein shall
be paid as a death benefit; if the age of the insured at the date of this
policy is less than ten years next birthday, the amount payable will be
according to the Infantile Table except as provided on the following
pages . . .
and the following pages contained the limitation that if death of the
insured occurred during the first twelve months from pneumonia, one
fourth of the amount otherwise payable will be paid to insured within six
months. Here it was held that the beneficiary was entitled to $37.50 since
the clause "except as is provided on the following pages" related to all
that had preceded it in the preliminary provision. The reason is that
although the rules of punctuation may be used to assist in determining
the intent of the parties, punctuation or the absence of punctuation in a
contract or deed is ineffective to control its construction as against the
plain meaning of the instrument.
An insurance contract is to be construed in accordance with the intention of the parties, the objective being to ascertain the intention of the
parties as expressed in the language used, without disregarding any of
its words or clauses or inserting words or clauses not used.
A policy of insurance will be construed as a whole with the purpose of giving effect to the intention of the contracting parties, except
insofar as a statute or authorized administrative order requires a different construction, and each word and clause will be given effect if possible by any reasonable construction. In ascertaining the intent of the
parties, consideration may be given to the circumstances of the parties
and the hazards involved.
Policies of insurance having been prepared by the insurer will be
liberally construed in favor of the insured, and strictly against the in" 17 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 1941).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1972

7

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 12

266

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

surer. An exception from liability is not favored. Subordinate conditions and provisions limiting and restricting the primary objective of the
policy to afford protection upon the happening of certain contingencies,
should be strictly construed against the insurer.
If the language is ambiguous, or reasonably susceptible to two interpretations, the courts will give it that interpretation which is most
favorable to the insured, in other words in favor of coverage. However,
the rule of liberal construction does not justify the courts in enlarging the
terms of the policy beyond the meaning of the language of the policy.
It was held in Skillman v. Acadia Mutual Life Insurance Company,15
that the plaintiff's right to recover if the insured came to death, directly
and independently of all other causes, from injuries sustained solely
through external, violent and accidental means as opposed to death from
existing illness or disease cooperating with and contributing to accidents,
was proper as instituted under the Accidental Benefit Agreement, which
was supplementary to ordinary life insurance policies which provide for
payment of additional amounts equal to the face amounts of the policies.
If the terms of a policy are plain and unambiguous the court must give
effect to them, construing the policy according to its terms. The courts
may not rewrite it and therefore make a new contract between the parties,
nor may the court under the guise of construction, insert provisions not
contained therein when there is no ambiguity in an insurance contract. It
was held in Anderson v. Allstate Insurance Company 6 that where deceased
while a passenger in an automobile designated as number one was killed
in a collision caused by the driver of automobile number two and deceased's administratrix paid the funeral expenses and executed a release
to the negligent driver of the second automobile, therefore she lost
her right to recover funeral expenses under the policy of the owner
of the automobile number one which provided for funeral expenses. The
policy also provided that insurer should be subrogated to the rights of
recovery of persons receiving payments, deceased insurer, which had
issued the policy providing for payment of funeral expenses up to $2000.00,
but providing that insurance with respect to the unowned automobile
shall be excess insurance, was liable only for funeral expenses in amount
of $373.25 because of destruction by administratrix of her claim against
the driver of the second automobile, thereby losing $1000.00.
Whether the terms of the policy are conflicting or ambiguous is a
16 127
10

S.E.2d 789 (N.C. 1962).
145 S.E.2d 845 (N.C. 1966).
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question of law for the court, and where the ultimate and controlling facts
are not in dispute, the construction of a policy becomes a matter of law.
The policy was construed as a matter of law in Parker v. State Capital
Life Insurance Company"7 where the insured seeking recovery under a
policy which contained a limitation requiring hospitalization within 30
days from the date of the accident in order to provide coverage under the
policy's special indemnities and hospital indemnity provision, entered the
hospital for treatment and later removal of a kidney was necessary
as a result of the fall in which the kidney had been injured and was
not covered 'by the policy even though medical testimony established
that the insured should have been hospitalized within 30 days after the
accident. The kidney was removed 51 days after the accident.
The terms of an insurance contract must be given their plain, ordinary,
and accepted meaning unless they have acquired a technical meaning in
the field of insurance, or unless it is apparent that another meaning was
intended. Where a term is defined in the policy, such definition will
ordinarily be applied to the term wherever it is used in the contract.
However, the term must be given the meaning as defined in the policy,
regardless of whether a broader or narrower meaning is customarily applied to such word, since the parties are free to contract and give words
embodied in their agreement the meaning they see fit.
Where technical terms are used which have a known meaning in the
business, parol evidence is competent to inform the court and jury as to
their exact meaning. However, parol evidence is not competent to explain
such terms, as was noted in Owens v. Reserve Loan Life Insurance Company,'8 where the insured failed to pay the ninth premium due, and he
therefore wrote to the company for a 90 day extension in order to pay
his premium. One day after the insured's death, the insurance company
unknowingly wrote a letter agreeing to extend the time upon certain conditions. It was held that the cash surrender value of this life policy became
effective only on written request of the insured and on valid surrender
of the policy; therefore, the beneficiary could not recover the cash or loan
value of the policy where such provisions had not been complied with.
Now where an insurer receives an additional premium for amending
the policy by substituting another word for a word used in the original
1, 130 S.E.2d 36 (N.C. 1963).
I 175 S.E. 203 (N.C. 1934).
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policy, the parties must necessarily intend that the substituted words
should cover a larger field of liability."
RIDERS

In the case of a rider, a rider must be construed with the policy and
harmonized therewith if possible, and the rider will not be held to alter
the provisions of the policy except to the extent that its provisions are in
subsitution of those of the original policy or in creation of a new and
different contract. In the case of irreconcilable conflict, the provisions
of the rider prevail as in the case of Mills v. State Life and Health Insurance CompanyP where it was held that the death of the insured who
was deliberately shot by a third person without provocation of the insured
resulted "directly and independently of all other causes from accidental
bodily injuries" within coverage of the policy and that the policy and
the rider provided coverage for employer without reference to whether
he was engaged in any duty pertaining to his occupation or self-employment.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, a policy of insurance will be construed with regard to
the main purposes of the contract, to guarantee the payment of premiums
to the insurer and to secure the policy against fraud and imposition; also
to give the insured the protection and benefits for which he pays. Literal
construction of procedural requirements will not be adopted when such
construction would defeat a primary purpose of the contract and compliance therewith is -made impossible through no fault of a party to the
contract by a circumstance later transpiring which could not have been
contemplated by the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.
Each clause must be given effect if this can be done by reasonable construction and differing clauses must be harmonized.
RANDAL ROGERS
"York

Industrial Center, Inc. v. Michigan Mutual Liability Company, 155

S.E.2d
501 (N.C. 19).
20 135 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1964).
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